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2ABSTRACT
The following paper examines transition economies of Russia, Ukraine and Poland. It
takes a look at their transition period into a market economy for the period between 1989
and 1997. It looks at the initial transformation policies implemented by these countries.
The effects of these policies determined the recovery of each nation. Poland was able to
implement broad reforms on the macro and micro level and as a result had a small
contraction period which was followed by a rapid recovery. Russia and Ukraine failed to
fully implement its reforms and as a result suffered economic downturn throughout this
period. The paper examines where Russia and Ukraine went wrong and what more
needed to be done. It compares the two countries to Poland and looks for possible
explanations for the economic slump.
3INTRODUCTION
The following paper examines transition economies of Russia, Ukraine and
Poland. It takes a look at their transition period into a market economy for the period
between 1989 and 1997. It looks at the initial transformation policies implemented by
these countries. The effects of these policies determined the recovery of each nation.
Poland was able to implement broad reforms on the macro and micro level and as a result
had a small contraction period which was followed by a rapid recovery. Russia and
Ukraine failed to fully implement its reforms and as a result suffered economic downturn
throughout this period. The paper examines where Russia and Ukraine went wrong and
what more needed to be done. It compares the two countries to Poland and looks for
possible explanations for the economic slump.
Mikhail Gorbachev started a series of reforms. As a result, the Soviet Union and
the countries it had significant influence over abandoned the centrally planned economies
and started transforming themselves into market economies. This happened to all the
Soviet Republics and its neighboring Eastern and Central European countries at the same
time. A common trend was seen throughout all of the transition economies. Output
declined, GDP declined and inflation soared.
There were common factors that led to the overall decline in output and GDP.1
Liberalization of domestic and external markets caused huge shifts in demand. The shifts
in demand were caused by demilitarization, decrease in investment, elimination of forced
substitution on the consumer side, and consumer freedom. Markets that were in place
during the Soviet times, such as the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)
and the Soviet inter-republic market, collapsed. Opening up of borders increased imports
1 Dabrowski, Rohozynsky and Sinitsina, 2004
4into these countries, this decreased the demand for domestic goods. Domestic firms were
not able to substitute decreased demand in their home markets by exports, because those
channels were not developed yet. Price liberalization created inflation, which increased
costs for the enterprises. Decrease in state subsidies and collapse of special price
arrangements all lead to many firms being unprofitable and unable to operate at past
levels. Managers also did not see a need to produce at the same levels as before because
there was no central plan that needed to be met. They needed to come up with new and
real incentives to expand production. Many managers did not yet posses the skills
required by the market economy. As a result many assumed they would be saved by the
government.2
The phenomenon of decreased output and GDP was the same for all the countries
in the transition period. What was not the same was the amount of time the countries
stayed in a contracted economy. That mainly depended on the speed and effectiveness of
reform policies and the country’s adaptation to the new economy. Poland was able to
recover within two years while Russia and Ukraine did not do so till 1999. This paper
looks at the decisions of Russia, Ukraine, and Poland to see how they influenced the
recovery process. It starts out with an overview of reform policies of each country and
the effect on their economies. Then it takes a closer look at some policies that were
significant to that country’s economic development. Some theories are then given to
explain why Poland was an almost immediate success while Russia and Ukraine weren’t.
Factors that are considered are liberalization environment of each country, the effects of
the unofficial sector on the economy, and the role that foreign direct investment (FDI)
played in their economies.
2 Ibid.
5RUSSIA
Overview of reforms and economy
In 1991 Yeltsin ended the communist regime in Russia, at the same time ending
the communist control over government and economy. New government and economic
system had to be developed to guide Russia through the transition period. In 1992 a
reform package was introduced, its purpose was to replace the command economy with
market. Prices, trade, and exchange rates were liberalized. Government budget was to be
reduced, one of the major reductions happened at the military level with a decrease of 68
percent. There was a reduction of subsidies to state enterprises. Also, bankruptcy
provisions were set up.
The release of prices caused an immediate inflation. In addition to that, the
central bank was following a loose monetary policy which led to a hyperinflation, 1,353
percent in 1992. (See Appendix Table 1) Wages tried to keep up with inflation, but there
were definite loses in real wages. The government decreased subsidies to state owned
enterprises (SOE), this led to cash shortages in many firms. Firms then tried to purchase
goods on account. When firms accrued high payables and failed to pay, suppliers in turn
failed to pay wages to their employees. This created a vicious cycle and together with
inability to pass up increased costs to the consumer led to output decline.3 GDP was in
decline in Russia until 1997, it declined by 14.5, 8.7, 12.6, 4.0 and 2.8 percent in 1992,
1993, 1994, 1995 and 1996 respectively. (See Appendix Table 2)
Russia experienced a big economic contraction which lasted between 1990 and
1997. One of the main reasons for that was the slow and inconsistent macroeconomic
stabilization and liberalization. It impeded structural and industrial changes which were
3 Gerber and Hout, 1998
6necessary to stop and reverse the declining economy. Reforms were improperly timed
and were inconsistent. The government did not focus on curbing inflation and getting
macroeconomic stabilization. In other countries stabilization was usually followed by
more political and economic reforms, which was not the case for Russia.4
Entry of new firms did not play a key role in boosting the economy in Russia, as
was the case in Poland, primarily because the firms were inefficient and most of the time
entered the unofficial economy. The primary reasons for that were huge government
regulation and unfriendly business and investment environments. Many businesses
joined the unofficial sector and tried to secure their profits even further by transferring
their assets offshore. This is one of the reasons for capital outflows in Russia during the
transition time. Another reason is low foreign direct investment which was very low in
Russia for the same reasons as new firm development. The FDI that did enter the country
usually went straight to the oil and natural gas sector ignoring all other aspects of the
economy.5 Large powerful private corporations were responsible for keeping the
economy afloat. However, their interests usually rested with themselves and were at
times detrimental to the society at large. Russia’s business did not focus much on
exports. The only goods exported in vast amounts were oil and natural gas. All other
industries ignored that option and as a result remained technologically underdeveloped
and uncompetitive. While this had an immediate consequence of reduced output, this
also affected future business growth and development.6
Privatization
4 Dabrowski, Rohozynsky and Sinitsina, 2004
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7Russia went through a rapid privatization phase where by 1994 most enterprises
were in private hands. A voucher program was introduced in 1992. It gave ownership
vouchers to company employees and mangers. As a result of this, company ownership
was highly diluted. In addition to that, managers controlled high shares of the firms they
managed. Both of these factors prevented close oversight of corporations by its owners
which gave a lot of power to the managers of corporations.7 This developed a large but
very weak private sector where interests of managers were not always matched with the
interests of the public.
The rate of privatization was too quick for Russia and was way ahead of proper
legislative and regulatory reforms. There was no system in place to guide the managers
of the new private businesses with proper governance and competition practices. As a
result, managers often sold of the assets of the business to secure quick capital gains
instead of focusing on long term operations and growth. Because Russian industry was
comprised of mainly large enterprises, privatizing them created large and powerful firms
guided by profit seeking managers. This also created a powerful lobby which thwarted
further economic reform. Unprofitable enterprises and those evading taxes led to loss of
fiscal revenues for the government. It also created huge income inequality.8
Privatized firms lacked sufficient market economy skills. They lacked a
competitive edge. Managers’ decisions reflected the influences of past times and they
were not able to adapt quickly to the changing conditions. Managers refused to lay off
7 Ibid.
8 The World Bank, 2002
8redundant workers and instead tried to focus on bargaining with suppliers and securing
payments from customers.9
Policies and arrangements that are in place but need to be reformed or eliminated
According to Buckberg, “achieving a successful transition requires the creation of
an institutional and regulatory environment that fosters investment and promotes new
private sector activity.”10 During the transition period Russia failed to achieve that. On
the contrary, investment was declining. Total investment decline was about 50, 12, 23
and 13 percent for 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995 respectively.11 Private sector activity was
rising primarily in the unofficial sector driven there by the unfavorable environment. FDI
was also low. Russia had to create a legal and regulatory environment that would foster
growth and encourage business to operate officially.12
The tax system must to undergo reforms. Different types of taxes when
accumulated lead to almost no after-tax profit. Distorted and unclear rules give a lot of
power to tax inspectors in interpreting them. This leads to widespread corruption and
uneven application. At times tax requirements are not even documented at the local
level. Errors are usually penalized with the same severity as fraudulent evasion. Tax
evasion usually occurs through transfer pricing with international subsidiaries keeping all
the profits by overstating expenses, moving profits to offshore accounts, and by
understating exports and overstating imports. High payroll and income taxes decrease
the demand for labor.13
9 Gerber and Hout, 1998
10 Buckberg, 1997
11 Gerber and Hout, 1998
12 Buckberg, 1997
13 Ibid.
9Taxes would have to be reduced for firms operating officially and complying with
the law. The extremely high costs of fully complying with tax laws drove managers to
underreport business activities. This type of behavior promotes nonmonetary
transactions and the hiding of income and assets usually in offshore accounts. Offshore
accounts then become a cause for decreasing investment in the economy, and also
decreasing funds for business operations.
Officials and bureaucracy also produce unfavorable business conditions.
Excessive documentation, long approval time, and high fees force businesses into the
underground economy. The government needs to make the requirements to start and
operate a business more transparent and the process faster. And individual wanting to
start a new business would have to go through a number of officials first finding out what
needs to be done and then doing it step by step, signature by signature. The whole
process could take months. This is another situation that facilitates corruption. “The cost
of corruption and bureaucratic delays may price some potential new business out of the
market, or drive them underground.”14
The legal environment needs major improvement. The public access to law is
limited. Some areas of the law are incomplete. Judiciary is not independent, judges and
prosecutors are corrupt. The court does not have enforcement mechanisms such as ability
to seize assets and liquidate them, and to have jurisdiction to seize offshore accounts.
Also, areas of property rights protection and contract law need to be developed. The
legal environment also fails to protect the public from crime. Judges are often threatened
and experience violence against them. Private businesses have to pay organized crime
14 Ibid.
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for protection. 76 percent of small businesses in Moscow in 1995 said they had to pay
for protection.15
UKRAINE
Overview of reforms and economy
Ukraine became an independent state in 1991. Independence brought a new form
of government and economic system. The Soviet time rule arrangements and overall
structure of the economic sector called for major reforms in order for Ukraine to survive
in the new environment.16
While part of the Soviet Union (SU) Ukraine had major factories such as steel
production, oil processing, coal mining and other chemical industries. Ukraine received
raw materials and energy from other republics to produce mostly intermediate goods,
only 20% were finished goods. After the collapse of SU, Ukraine was left with the large
manufacturing plants but no sure source of raw materials and energy. With the collapse
of the SU, the major transportation and economic links collapsed as well. This was
primarily due to the introduction of new national currencies in the independent republics
which led to problems determining proper exchange rates and problems with inter-bank
relations. These factors hindered international trade. Furthermore, there was an overall
change in foreign trade conditions. With the end of the Cold War there was a decline in
the demand for military goods. Opening up of borders had an effect of increased
competition with products from international firms. It also became hard to find buyers
15 Ibid
16 International Labor Office, 1998
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for the intermediate goods that Ukraine used to produce. There was a decrease in real
income of citizens. All these fast changes were detrimental to the business sector.17
The manufacturing factories in Ukraine were very large. They controlled the
production of goods and services and had large market shares in the economy. This made
the economy very monopolistic and inflexible. The people running these factories were
very well connected to the government and suppliers. The factories provided
employment to a big percentage of population. Because of these conditions, the
government was interested in keeping the big industry in operation, which often resulted
in a lot of financial support. The firms assumed a kind of ‘too big to fail’ role in the
economy. This limited competition. It created huge barriers of entry for the small firms,
on one side there were the mangers of factories who had close ties to suppliers and
government, on the other side the government itself did not want the added competition
of new firms. In addition to this, the citizens themselves were weary of private enterprise
because of long years of Soviet conditioning.
However, Ukraine did possess a few good things in terms of valuable resources.
Ukranians are a large and well educated labor force. Ukraine has fertile land; 60 percent
of the worlds black soil is located in Ukraine. And high reserves of coal, iron ore, and
other raw materials.18
Macroeconomic Trends 1990-1997
Analysis of GDP shows a declining trend starting in 1989. (See Appendix Table 2
for more details.) Main cause for initial economic slowdown was disappearance of trade
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
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networks. Because major industries were monopolistic, the increases in prices of raw
materials and energy were transformed to the consumer.
In 1992 the government released its hold over prices. Energy prices
instantaneously skyrocketed. The industries asked the government for subsidies. This
led to an inflationary monetary policy and huge budget deficit. The result was a
devastating hyperinflation, reaching 1,210 and 4,735 percent in 1992 and 1993
respectively. (See Appendix Table 1) The government tried to set up some controls, such
as controlling prices of key inputs, regulating wages in the public sector, and reducing
social programs. These policies did little to curb inflation. In addition, the government
had no control over the expanding private sector. Overall business activity was at a slow
down. Sales and investment plummeted giving difficulties for the firms to raise operating
funds. The firms were not able to collect from its customers and as a result couldn’t pay
its suppliers. This had a chain effect throughout the whole economy.
In 1994 Leonid Kuchma became President of Ukraine. One of his main goals was
economic stabilization. Through a series of reforms he took action to accelerate
privatization, took steps in unification of the foreign exchange rate, suspended price
regulation, reduced subsidies to unprofitable firms, liberalized foreign trade, and set up
strict monetary and fiscal policies. The immediate effect was a decrease in inflation,
which in 1994 dropped from 4,735 to 842 percent, increase in foreign trade and a
decrease in the budget deficit. However, GDP growth did not recover. GDP decreased
by 22.9, 12.2, 10.0 and 3.4 percent in 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997. (See Appendix Table
2) The main reasons for that came out from the decreased government spending in the
form of lower investment. This reflected on the private sector which also tightened credit
13
controls. In addition foreign direct investment in Ukraine was very low. All of these
factors led to little or no investment into new technology. Without new technology a
transition economy cannot adjust to new times and this in turn slowed down the overall
growth of the economy.
Agriculture
Ukraine has one of the richest soils in the world; however its agricultural output
has been suffering. Slow privatization and government intervention have been the main
obstacles for growth. Privatization has been slow because there has been no clear policy
regarding land privatization and land ownership. Government intervention was also
much higher than in the enterprise sector. Government controlled marketing, state
procurement, inter-localities sales, exports, and pricing. Local agencies named
Commissions on Movements of Agricultural Commodities used to exercise enormous
control over regulation, licenses, and permits. They oversee the movement of grains and
are the people that can either give you permission to sell your output or not. Such large
powers at the local level present a lot of corruption. Landowners with connections get
preferential treatment. The current structure also has no incentives for efficient
growth.19
FDI problems
The lack of foreign direct investment can be attributed to the fact that foreign
companies do not want to invest in Ukraine. The main reasons are legal and regulatory
instability, unfair application of licensing rules, fragile banking system, and widespread
corruption.20
19 Kaufmann, 1997
20 Ibid.
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Kaufman lists some of the specific reasons why foreign firms do not want to enter
Ukraine. Ukraine has no commercial tax and land codes, this makes it hard to finalize a
contract. Bankruptcy law has no provision for restructuring; in this case, firms are able to
incur debts and then declare bankruptcy fleeing with the money. Corporate, payroll and
income taxes are high. Registration time for a new business and fees charged for licenses
and permits are high, this leads to high startup costs and to increase in the unofficial
economy. There is a restriction that permits businesses to have only one bank account,
this regulates the amount of funds available for withdrawal and makes freezing of funds
easier. Local administration is usually very powerful and corrupt. The administrators
often do things that benefit themselves and not the economy or the people at large.
Ambiguous laws and high taxes often lead to side arrangements with the government, this
fosters unfair competition and increase in corruption. This is also seen in the biding
process for contracts, where the party with better connections is more likely to receive the
contract. Finally, the overall environment of high levels of crime and corruption makes
investments in Ukraine very risky. This translates to FDI being on average $4 per capita
per year during the transition period.21
Informal Sector
Aside from the monopolistic manufacturing sector, Ukrainian economy also
developed a huge informal or unofficial sector. (See Appendix Table 3 for more details.)
The unofficial economy was estimated to be about 12, 46 and 50 percent in 1989, 1994,
and 1996 respectively.22 The main reasons for the development of the unofficial sector
were high taxes, foreign trade regulations, foreign exchange restrictions, unstable and
21 Ibid
22 Kaufmann and Kaliberda, 1996
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unclear legislation, and problems in the progress of privatization. These regulatory type
factors were joined together with a sort of people side demand for the informal sector.
Ukrainian people faced very few employment possibilities, they saw a decrease in their
real wages, non payment of wages, and were fired or laid of from the state enterprises.
As a result, they had nowhere else to turn but to the informal sector. The informal sector
then became a buffer for individuals needing work and income. It became a medium for
new and emerging firms to exist in and grow. Another positive effect of the informal
sector is that it made the economy and markets more flexible, something that the big
enterprises could not provide.23
The arguments against the informal sector are that it is bad for the economic
stability because of its huge size. It reduces state revenues because firms operating in the
informal sector are less likely to pay the full amount of taxes, or not pay taxes at all. It is
bad for fair competition because of all sorts of corruptive relationships that are formed
between the parties including the government. And it produces no incentives for firms to
enter the formal sector.24
The main driving force for the unofficial economy is the high operating costs
produced by politicians and legislature. Politicians wanting more power and money try
to get control and significant influence over the business activities. The way they are
able to get it done is through bureaucratic and administrative pressure. To side pass the
overwhelming degree of administrative paperwork and time, businesses have to bribe the
officials to expedite the process. Increases in administrative controls, types of permits
and licenses, and taxes usually yield an increase in the amount of the bribes. Also,
23 International Labor Office, 1998
24 Ibid.
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managers have to spend an increasing amount of time with officials trying to work things
through. This creates high operating costs for those trying to do business officially. In
order to survive mangers move their businesses fully or partially into the unofficial
economy. Even though the unofficial economy still involves many side payments to such
parties as tax officials, it is still considered cheaper than operating in the official
economy.
What needs to be done
Major macroeconomic reforms implemented during the Kuchma administration
served their purpose of stabilizing the economy. However, they did little to expedidte its
growth. Kaufman argues that there needs to be a series of reforms done on a micro level,
to liberalize the private sector and enable it to freely function and grow. He has a theory
that promotes “pro-private sector development policies” (PSD).25 The key thing is to
reduce the high costs that impede firms from operating efficiently. These high costs arise
from unstable legislation, high taxes, and trade constraints. These regulatory costs are the
highest for Ukraine as compared to other developing countries. In a survey it was
established that Ukrainian firms face the biggest barriers in import and export
restrictions, taxes, some price interventions, and slow privatization. Also managers of
private firms find themselves spending lots of time with government officials gaining
permits or licenses in order to be able to operate their business. This adds to their
operating costs and affects both official and unofficial enterprises.
These factors function as breaks for the overall economy. There is delayed output
because high operating costs serve as barriers for new firms to enter the economy and
25 Kaufmann, 1997
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also force existing firms into bankruptcy. Firms which are unable to function in the
official economy end up switching to the unofficial sector.26
A full out reform program has to come at once in order to liberalize markets at
micro level. Costs of doing business in the formal sector have to come down. Tax and
regulatory reforms have to be implemented. A new wave of deregulation is also needed.
It should come in the form of eliminating permits and licenses, except those that are
needed for health and safety reasons. Rules have to be clear and not confusing. Abuse of
power at the local level has to be eliminated to avoid further corruption. Requirements
on exports and prices have to be eliminated. Agricultural restrictions have to be
removed; especially those focused on pricing, exports, and inter locality trading.
Registration of new firms has to become easier in order for new firms to enter and
facilitate more efficient and competitive markets. Privatization has to occur at a much
faster rate.27
As far as the tax reform goes, tax rates for corporations have to be lower. Payroll
tax has to be lowered as well. New firms should be able to operate at lower tax rates
while they try to establish themselves. This will give further incentives for entrepreneurs
to open up businesses and for existing firms to move from the unofficial to official
economy. Another incentive for firms to move from the unofficial sector to official is to
forgive past tax evasion. There also has to be a lower tax rate for foreigners to attract
FDI. Elimination of import duties to exporters can serve as an incentive to export more.28
POLAND
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
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Overview of reforms and economy
Poland started its reform process in 1989, earlier than most Eastern European
countries. It implemented a wide range of reforms in a very short period of time, a
concept some call as a ‘shock therapy’. Its contraction period reached the lowest level in
1991 and then reversed itself producing considerable growth in GDP and investment.
GDP growth was -11.6, -7, 2.6, 3.8, 5.2, 7, 6.1 and 6.9 percent for 1990, 1992, 1993,
1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997. (See Appendix Table 2) Investment averaged about 16
percent per year during that time.29 Macroeconomic stability and institutional reforms
were able to foster these results.
Before the start of the transition period, Poland was considered by many to be in a
very bad shape. It experienced high inflation, large external debt, and a large black
market for currencies. However, it was able to turn itself around quickly and even serve
as a model transition economy. Some of the reasons for that were its initial conditions.
Political reforms began early in Poland. Poland already had an existing private sector,
which comprised about 25 percent of the economy. There was broad initial price and
trade liberalization. Obstacles to foreign trade were broken down which led to trade
being developed with the West. This in turn enabled firms to restructure themselves
quickly and become internationally competitive. A lot of external debt was forgiven to
Poland, this lowered its outstanding debt and served as one of the attractions for future
FDI. There were low entry barriers for new firms. As a result many new firms entered,
labor was able to move from state owned enterprises into the new private sector.
Legislature immediately developed contract enforcement. The government developed
hard budget constraints for public enterprises which lowered their burden on fiscal
29 Dabrowski, Rohozynsky and Sinitsina, 2004
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policies. Entrepreneurship was encouraged. Social safety net was maintained through
out the transition process to help citizens cope with uncertainty. On top of all this there
was a careful macroeconomic policy which was put into place with a focus on foreign
exchange policy which kept Poland’s currency from being overvalued and staying
competitive.30
Exports
Because of the above conditions Poland was able to experience prolonged growth
between the periods of 1991 and 1997. Growth was primarily driven by exports. Poland
was able to quickly find new trading partners and its exports to EU rose to a stable 70
percent. This contributed to a competitive manufacturing industry.31 Manufacturing
turned out to be one of the primary contributors to output. By 1997 it accounted for more
than 60 percent of the aggregate value-added.32
New firms
Increase in the number of firms in the industry also contributed to economic
growth. During the communist times large size industrial firms dominated the industry.
Emergence of a large number of small firms was a correction to that distortion and a
development of a consumer services oriented small business sector.33 The new small and
medium sized firms played a key role in Poland’s economy. They were able to facilitate
economic restructuring, absorb labor resources, and develop new business leaders who
were not influenced by the old regime. Table 4 in the Appendix shows an increase in the
30 De Broeck and Koen, 2000
31 Dabrowski, Rohozynsky and Sinitsina, 2004
32 De Broeck and Koen, 2000
33 Ibid.
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commercial law companies many of which were joint ventures with foreign investment.
The private sector was able to double its contribution to the economy between 1989 and
1994 from 28 percent to 58 percent respectively34 and by 1998 it accounted for 70
percent of output and employment.
Problems
Poland did face some problems during the transformation period. A prevailing
problem was unemployment. Unemployment was zero while economy was centrally
planned. This created a lot of redundant workers. Once the economy moved into a
market system, many businesses in order to stay competitive had to lay off the
unnecessary labor force. That, together with the contraction between 1989 and 1991,
produced high unemployment. Even as private sector output rose, employment did not
keep up at the same pace.35
There was some form of corruption going on, although on a much lower scale
than in Ukraine and Russia. It was something that was inherited from the communist
times. While power was concentrated at the top and transparency was low officials had
the tendency to be corrupt. Some of that was still left in Polish society. In addition to
that the people themselves were used to it to some extent. After World War II the
country was under heavy influence of the Soviet Union. State controlled enterprises were
seen as unfriendly. Therefore, it was the norm to accept corruption at that level because
people didn’t feel that it was detrimental to them or their country, rather to that alien
regime. Those feelings might have still existed during transition time.36 However,
corruption in Poland was pretty low. A good indicator of that would be the size of the
34 Borish and Noel, 1996
35 De Broeck and Koen, 2000
36 The World Bank, 1999
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unofficial economy. In 1994 it was estimated to employ only about 5 percent of the labor
force.37 Johnson and Kaufman show a decreasing trend of the unofficial economy in
Poland, 15.2 percent for 1994, which is a much lower number than other transition
economies.38 (See Table 3 in the Appendix for more details.)
A closer look at Poland’s fight with the unofficial economy and corruption shows
a series of well implemented reforms. It held elections at the national and local levels,
electing people who were not in power during communism. It removed lobbying
organizations with special interests which existed prior to the transition period. Worker
councils fired managers of organizations in the beginning of transition period. All of
these steps were aimed at reducing the influence of self motivated groups and
government officials.39 These actions together with reforms at the macro and micro
levels helped curb corruption and unofficial economy.
Other things that were a bit problematic were unprofitable state owned enterprises
along with some other private firms. It was also hard to privatize or liquidate some SOEs
because they were unappealing to investors. In addition to that, it is hard to liquidate
major industries in an economy that has significant unemployment figures, which were as
high as 16 percent at a certain point. A problem that occurred with many private firms
was that they did not invest in capital assets. Instead earnings were spent on consumer
goods and not left inside the business. This was more of a problem for the future because
longevity and growth depend on the capital assets producing the output. Another
problem which was prevalent among transition economies was the increasing arrears.
37 Borish and Noel, 1996
38 Johnson and Kaufmann, 2001
39 Ibid.
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This created tightening of credit and put more emphasis on cash and barter transactions
which decreased liquidity for private firms.40
Privatization
Privatization was slow in Poland. Many thought that newly privatized firms
would not be able to adapt to the fast changing market conditions. This could have led to
a wide range of bankruptcies and then to social turmoil.41 The government also wanted to
institute proper reforms before turning the business sector into the private hands.
Because of extra time, the government was able to shop around for different privatization
options. Some enterprises were privatized through the sale of shares on the Warsaw
Stock Exchange. About 1000 medium sized firms had their assets and liabilities sold off
through installment sales.42 Many firms were privatized together with foreign investors.
This also attracted FDI. Table 4 in the Appendix gives some sort of a picture into the rate
of privatization in Poland between 1990 and 1998. You can see that in 1990 out of 107
started privatizations only 6 were complete. This rate increased over the years and in
1998 there were 4,684 privatizations started and 3,081 were completed. Another
important factor to point out was that Poland entered the transition period with an already
existing private sector. In 1989 it made up 25 percent of GDP. As a result it did not have
to rush to turnover high amounts of privatized entities. The outcome, of course, was
favorable because Poland always had a substantial private sector and was still able to
increase its size but with much better quality than other transition economies.43
40 Borish and Noel, 1996
41 Paci, Sasin and Verbeek, 2004
42 The World Bank, 2002
43 de Melo, Denizer and Gleb, 1996
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AN OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS OF TRANSITION
Table 5 and Table 6 in the Appendix provide a good overview as to the success of
each countries transition policies. Table 5 presents GDP change for Poland, Russia and
Ukraine in terms of their 1989 GDP levels. 1989 serves as a benchmark year in order to
judge how well the country performed in terms of GDP. By 1998 Poland has seen a
definite increase in its GDP over its 1989 levels. Even though after ten years it has only
seen a 17 point increase in its GDP levels, it is still impressive considering that it
underwent a tremendous transformation and was able to adjust to a new economic
system. The same cannot be said about Russia and Ukraine. They are well below their
1989 levels with Ukraine loosing almost two thirds of its GDP. These results can be
attributed to the failures in their reform policies and inability to quickly adjust to the new
economic system.
Table 6 presents a look at how Russia and Poland rank up in attracting FDI during
the transition period. FDI for Poland has seen a considerable increase with a 2.9 percent
of its GDP in the period between 1996 and 1999. However, Russia in the same period is
almost at the same level as Poland was between 1992 and 1995. Russia’s inability to
attract FDI shows a failure in its political and economic policies during this period. This
failure can also be attributed to its contracted economy.
Why Russia and Ukraine did not see the same rapid growth as Poland
Kaufman offers a pretty simple explanation to the above question: “Ukraine and
Russia share an anti-PSD regulatory and tax environment, that is a nonliberalized
economy from a microeconomic perspective. This is in sharp contrast with Poland,
which has had a pro-PSD environment for years. Not surprisingly, Russia and Ukraine
24
have only a small fraction of the number of new enterprises that Poland has, although the
latter is by far the least populated of the three countries.”44
Liberalization index
The focus on micro level liberalization has also been looked at by the World
Bank. They have developed a liberalization index. The function of that index is to
measure how GDP is affected by the level of reforms done in a country. It measures the
reforms that are needed to make markets the main mechanisms of allocating resources in
an economy, also considering those policies that stabilize the economic environment,
liberalize trade, and promote competition. Countries are ranked on a scale of 0 to 1. 0
represents an untrasformed and centrally planned economy, and 1 represents a fully
implemented market economy. Table 8 in the Appendix lists the results for Russia,
Ukraine, and Poland. It is of no surprise that Poland is ranked much higher on the index
than Russia and Ukraine. World Bank adds that countries with “better policies are
associated with higher annual growth of GDP.”45
Capture Economy
A theory offered by Hellman, Jones and Kaufman states that under certain
conditions companies can have such significant influence that they have the policy
makers and the economy overall working for their advantage, or in other words they
‘capture the economy’. When one firm extracts huge benefits from the government, it
captures it. As a result society suffers, usually by 10 percent over a three year period.46
Large firms with ties to the state usually get preferential treatment in ways of
secure property and contractual rights. They then enjoy higher growth rates than the rest
44 Kaufmann, 1997
45 The World Bank, 2002
46 Hellman, Jones, Kaufmann, 2000
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of the firms. When new firms enter an industry, in order to be competitive they turn to
state capture in a strategic type way. For them, state capture is not a substitute for
innovation, but is a substitute for the weakness in the legal and regulatory framework.
The authors argue that by improving reforms to full liberalization, a country can reduce
the extent of the capture economy by 15-30 percent.47
The authors classify different types of corruption into three categories
administrative corruption, state capture, and influence. Administrative corruption is the
amount that firms spend in illicit and non transparent payments to public officials in order
to receive alternative treatment in regards to some established law. State capture is the
amount that firms spend in illicit and non transparent payments to public officials in order
to influence the making of new laws, rules and regulations by government. Influence is
the degree which firms have in establishing new laws, rules and regulations by
government.
Results for administrative corruption are as follows: Poland spends 1.6 percent of
revenues, Russia 2.8, and Ukraine 4.4. Poland shows the lowest administrative
corruption. This result can be linked directly to the fact that out of the three countries
Poland has the lowest unofficial economy, while Ukraine the highest.
The results for captors and influential enterprises are summarized in Table 9 in
the Appendix. They show that Poland has the lowest influential firms, 3, as a percentage
of the total firms in the sample. It ties with Russia at 9 percent of captor firms. Ukraine
once again has the highest captors and influential firms, 12 and 14 percent respectively.
The overall capture economy index for Poland is 12, while Russia and Ukraine both score
47 Ibid.
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a 32. Poland is classified as a low captor economy, while both Russia and Ukraine are
classified as high.
The authors note that larger firms are more likely to participate in state capture.
They have the highest demand for resources and therefore have a higher probability of
influence and state capture. They usually pay less bribes as a percentage of revenues
because they have many more options of how to deal with the state. However, smaller
firms are much more impacted by administrative corruption.
The social costs of state capture are very severe. With state capture companies
are able to buy extra barriers to enter for their potential competitors. The government
will tend to undersupply the public with needed services if it is able to provide it to a few
firms for money. Empirical evidence shows that in low capture countries the real rate of
sales growth over the three years studied was 21.4 percent. In big capture countries it
was 11.1 percent, a 10 point difference. Same was the case with investment rates, 21.1
percent for low capture countries compared to 11.5 for high.48
This study shows why Poland would outperform both Russia and Ukraine. It had
a much lower unofficial sector and lower corruption. It also developed sufficient policies
and reforms where a firm would need to pay for extra protection of an unavailable public
good. Plus, its private sector is composed of a large number of small firms who would
probably not have the money or the power to capture or influence policy making. That is
not the case in Russia and Ukraine which are dominated by large industries who do have
the power and the resources to capture their economies. As a result the society suffers
while the few gain.
Strategic Alliances and FDI
48 Ibid.
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Strategic alliances are an important part of a growing economy. They provide a
source of added assets from the partners. They provide access to resources and
capabilities and are a way of getting access to new technology without capital outlays.
During the SU, there were no private property rights. This provided little incentives to
invest in new technology to make processes more efficient. As a result Soviet companies
and the private enterprises that succeeded them were left with outdated technology that
put them at a competitive disadvantage. One of the ways to go about in obtaining new
technology would be through strategic alliances. A government can encourage that by
providing special tax subsidies. However, that did not happen in either Russia or
Ukraine. Russian government never made a distinction between firms that had foreign
partners and those that did not. The main reason for that was the unstable environment.49
Strategic alliances in Russia and Ukraine were influenced by the unstable
government and institutional structure. So they tended to be short term focused with
special emphasis on the partners who were able to provide finances or access to financial
resources. No consideration was given to developing a good capital structure for long
term operations. Russian managers were primarily focused on short term investments
because of their inabilities to price long term ones. The uncertainty of long term returns
were caused by political risks which would require higher premiums to accept the risk.50
Government in Poland, on the other hand, encouraged foreign investment. That
can be seen through their increasing FDI and policies facilitating investment. It can also
be seen through their privatization program where many state firms where privatized to
49 Hitt, Ahlstrom, Dacin, Levitas and Svobodina, 2004
50 Ibid
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foreign companies or to joint ventures with foreign companies. This stimulated their
technological development and increased competitiveness for their enterprises.
Strategic alliances with foreign companies are a source of FDI. While the above
paragraphs focus on Russia’s and Ukraine’s reluctance to seek long term strategic
alliances with other firms, this one looks at the other side to see if the foreign company is
attracted to an investment in a particular country. Faria and Mauro propose the
characteristics that a foreign company would look for when evaluating its investment in
another country. Institutional quality is a big factor. It looks at things like the type of
regulation, red tape and corruption found in a country. Corporate governance is also
important, lack of which might signal an unfriendly environment to business. Human
capital and natural resources are also significant factors.51
FDI brings in equity investment that may be very valuable to a firm. During the
transition period from plan to market a firm’s only source of financing may be the bank.
Efficient equity markets take a long time to develop, so a bank based system is
developed. Banks loan money to firms and in turn they are able to provide better
monitoring of the firms than shareholders would.52 However, it is bad for the firms to be
dependant solely on debt financing. In times of high inflation and high interest rates it
can be very costly. Firms then also become more affected by bank and economic crises.
So in transition economies the best source of sufficient equity financing can be FDI.
Another thing worth mentioning is that during the transition period in Russia and Ukraine
banks did not really lend to firms. Russia and Ukraine had the worst performing banks
51 Faria and Mauro, 2004
52 Popov, 1999
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when it came to allocating credit to firms. 53(See Appendix Table 10) Instead banks
invested their portfolios into government treasuries which were made to keep up with
inflation.
Russian and Ukrainian enterprises did not receive substantial FDI, they did not
receive any bank credits, and profits were sent offshore. The lack of these 3 financing
sources is a reasonable explanation as to why there was no growth or expansion. Russian
and Ukrainian enterprises had no way to grow, there were no investment funds available
for them to expand. This explains the negative investment percentages, the declining
GDP, and the lack of capital improvements throughout the enterprises.
CONCLUSION
This paper presented an overview of transition economies of Russia, Ukraine, and
Poland. It also tried to address the reasons why Russia and Ukraine were not as
successful as Poland in quickly rehabilitating themselves from the initial contraction that
followed the collapse of their command economies. The main factor that played a
significant role in determining how successful the transition period would be was the
extent of reforms in each country.
Russia and Ukraine were not able to produce the same package of reforms that
Poland shelled out. They tried to do the right thing by liberalizing their macroeconomic
variables and letting the market determine supply and demand. However while the
economy at large seemed to be operating at a market level, the individual firms were not
able to fully participate in that economy and contribute to it. There were many barriers
that existed at the firm level which prevented the economy from growing. These barriers
53 Huang, Marin and Xu, 2004
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were the result of unfinished reforms. Wile much was done to stabilize the economy, like
efforts to decrease inflation and excessive government spending, there was little done in a
way to promote fair and competitive growth of the private sector. The lack of these basic
reforms and governance structures were then the main cause to all the other troubles that
took place. Whether it was an insufficient tax system, an insufficient legal system, a
growing unofficial economy, red tape, widespread corruption, negative investment rates,
or low FDI, it can all be attributed to the lack of initial reforms at the local level. These
reforms were needed to promote private sector growth and participation in the economy.
The absence of these policies instead promoted the exact opposite of what the two
countries were trying to achieve.
Poland, on the other hand, introduced a huge wave of reforms. These reforms
helped the country to get back on its feet quickly. It introduced policies that encouraged
private sector development at a measured pace. It focused on getting its reforms in place
and economy stabilized before it was to swell up with eager entrepreneurs. This helped it
develop a healthy private sector that was contributing to the economy and society. It also
encouraged and was able to attract FDI along with an extensive exporting network. This
made Polish companies competitive worldwide and ensured their future development.
A couple of theories took a step in explaining the differences between Russia and
Ukraine with Poland. The liberalization index developed by the World Bank quantified
the degree of reform in each transition economy. It then showed that the countries with
higher levels of reform were also better performing economically. This once again put
the light on Russia’s and Ukraine’s lack of reforms as one of the causes to their economic
derailment. The capture economy theory shows how corrupt officials together with
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unethical mangers can cause a stagnation in legislative and regulatory development.
When a company buys special legislation that only helps that company, the rest of the
society suffers. The lack of FDI in Russia and Ukraine, as discussed before, caused for
insufficient capital development in the private firms.
Going through a transition is very tough. As illustrated in this and many other
papers, it is a very uncertain and dark road. However, credit has to be given to the
countries that are struggling with it. Turning your whole economy upside down
overnight while trying to maintain stability in the country is an extremely tough thing to
accomplish. Therefore, it will definitely take some time before these countries will be
able to develop well functioning economies.
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APPENDIX
Table 1
Inflation for Poland Russia and Ukraine, 1989-1994
1989 1990 1991 1992 1992 1994
Poland 251 586 70.3 43 35.3 32.2
Russia 2.2 5.6 92.7 1,353 896 220
Ukraine 2 4 91.2 1,210 4,735 842
Note: Inflation is represented by average annual change in the consumer
price index.
Source: de Melo, Denizer, Gelb, 1996
Table 2
Growth of Real GDP for Poland, Russia and Ukraine, 1990-1997
Percent per year
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Poland -11.6 -7.0 2.6 3.8 5.2 7.0 6.1 6.9
Russia -2.3 -5.0 -14.5 -8.7 -12.6 -4.0 -2.8 0.8
Ukraine -3.6 -8.7 -9.9 -14.2 -22.9 -12.2 -10.0 -3.4
Source: Berg, Borensztein, Sahay and Zettelmeyer, 1999
Table 3
Unofficial Economy for Poland, Russia and Ukraine, 1989-1995
Percent of GDP
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Poland 15.7 19.6 23.5 19.7 18.5 15.2 12.6
Russia 12.0 14.7 23.5 32.8 36.7 40.3 41.6
Ukraine 12.0 16.3 25.6 33.6 38.0 45.7 48.9
Source: Johnson and Kaufman, 2001
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Table 4
Poland's Private Sector Development, 1989-1998
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Commercial law companies 16,905 36,267 53,771 69,907 83,283 95,017 104,922 115,739 126,465 136,497
# of the above with foreign capital 429 1,645 4,796 10,131 15,167 19,737 24,086 28,622 32,942 36,850
State enterprises 7,337 8,453 8,228 7,245 5,924 4,955 4,357 3,847 3,369 2,906
# of firms started privatization 107 1,297 2,056 2,635 3,132 3,582 3,953 4,178 4,648
# of firms completed privatization 6 228 612 989 1,380 1,930 2,503 2,837 3,081
Percentage of total output 30.9 42.1 47.1 52.0 53.3 57.9 60.1 67.2
Percentage of employment 46.2 48.9 54.1 56.0 58.9 60.6 62.4 65.1 68.2 70.7
Source: De Broeck, Koen, 2000
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Table 5
GDP Change In Poland, Russia and Ukraine 1989-1998
Index, 1989=100
1994 1995 1998
Poland 92 98 117
Russia 51 49 55
Ukraine 44 39 37
Source: Johnson and Kaufman, 2001
Table 6
Share of FDI as a Percentage of GDP for Poland and Russia
1992-1995 1996-1999
USD millions % of GDP USD millions % of GDP
Poland 2,540 0.6 17,096 2.9
Russia 3,965 0.3 8,412 0.7
Source: The World Bank, 2002
Table 7
Private Sector Share Estimates as a Percentage of GDP for
Poland Russia and Ukraine, 1990-1996
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Poland 27 31.4 45.3 47 53 58 60
Russia 6 6 23.5 32.9 50 58 60
Ukraine 10 10 25.5 18.7 31 36.5 42
Source: Berg, Borensztein, Sahay and Zettelmeyer, 1999
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Table 8
Liberalization Index for Poland, Russia and
Ukraine, for the years 1990, 1995, 1998
1990 1995 1998
Poland 0.6 0.8 0.9
Russia >0.2 0.6 <0.6
Ukraine >0.2 >0.6 0.6
Note: Numbers are approximate because taken from a chart.
Source: The World Bank, 2002
Table 9
Capture Economy for Poland, Russia and Ukraine
Administrative Corruption Captors Influential
Capture
Economy Classification
% of revenue
% of
sample
% of
sample Index
Poland 1.6 9 3 12 Low
Russia 2.8 9 7 32 High
Ukraine 4.4 12 14 32 High
Source: Hellman, Jones, Kaufmann, 2000
Table 10
Bank Credit to Private Sector as a Percentage of GDP for Poland,
Russia and Ukraine, for the years 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999
1994 1996 1997 1999
Poland 12 16 18 19
Russia 12 7 8 12
Ukraine 5 1 2 9
Source: Huang, Marin and Xu, 2004
